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485 
Closing Time: Removing the State of Oklahoma 
from Alcohol Regulation in Indian Country 
The United States Constitution contemplates three types of sovereigns 
existing within the country’s borders: the federal government, the states, 
and “the Indian tribes.”1 As to the relationship between the federal 
government and the tribes, the Supreme Court determined in 1831 that 
tribes constitute “domestic dependent nations,” likening their relationship to 
the federal government as “a ward to his guardian.”2 From this language, 
the Court eventually held that Congress exercises plenary power over 
tribes. But the states do not hold any type of constitutional authority over 
tribes. In fact, one year after deeming the tribes as wards to their federal 
guardians, the Court established that state law did not apply in tribal 
territory.3  
While this point of law has gained some nuance over the years,4 a state’s 
ability to impose its laws on a tribe remains subject to “an accommodation 
between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one 
hand, and those of the State, on the other.”5 Those determinations generally 
come from litigation between states and tribes—not from federal 
legislation. But one major exception exists: 18 U.S.C. § 1161. This federal 
statute expressly requires that alcohol transactions in Indian country 
conform with state alcohol laws. Consequently, in the context of alcohol, 
tribes may not enact alcohol laws that conflict with those of the state. 
Through 18 U.S.C. § 1161, Congress has allowed state law to bleed into 
Indian country and bind tribal sovereigns. 
The effects of this statutory scheme are magnified in Oklahoma. The 
State of Oklahoma coexists with thirty-eight other sovereigns located 
within its borders.6 And those tribes do more than passively exist. For 
example, tribes generate substantial economic impact within the state: a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”). 
 2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 3. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595 (1832). 
 4. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561) (“[I]t was ‘long ago’ that ‘the Court departed from Chief Justice 
Marshall's view that “the laws of [a State] can have no force” within reservation 
boundaries.’”). 
 5. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 
(1980). 
 6. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019, 5019-25 (Jan. 29, 2016).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
486 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:485 
 
 
2012 study estimated that tribes created $10.8 billion of economic activity,7 
and in 2014, tribal gaming alone accounted for $6.9 billion of economic 
impact.8 Further, over one million acres9 (and growing)10 of Indian 
country11 exist within the state, which inevitably leads to jurisdictional 
disputes as each sovereign attempts to govern its territory and citizens. In 
terms of civil regulatory jurisdiction, the state and tribes have disagreed 
over the state’s ability to regulate non-Indians engaged in a number of 
activities in Indian country,12 including alcohol regulation.13  
                                                                                                                 
 7. STEVEN C. AGEE ECON. RESEARCH & POLICY INST., OKLA. CITY UNIV., THE 
STATEWIDE IMPACTS OF OKLAHOMA TRIBES 15 (2012), https://sovnationcenter.okstate.edu/ 
sites/default/files/documents/Tribal%20Impact%20Report.pdf. 
 8. KYLE D. DEAN & MATTHEW S. ROBINSON, OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, STATEWIDE 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM OKLAHOMA TRIBAL GOVERNMENT GAMING: 2015 ANNUAL IMPACT 
REPORT 5 (2015), http://oiga.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/OIGA-2015-Annual-Impact-
Report-singlepg.pdf. 
 9. District II, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OJS/DOLE/ 
DistrictII/index.htm (last visited May 12, 2017) (“Of Oklahoma's 77 counties, 63 contain 
over a million acres of Indian country trust and restricted land.”). 
 10. Under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), tribes may petition 
the Secretary of the Interior to convert “fee land to trust status by accepting legal title to the 
land in the name of the United States in trust for a tribe or individual Indian.” COHEN'S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.07[1][b], at 1041 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. The Supreme Court has held that the IRA land into 
trust provision is only available to those tribes under federal jurisdiction at the time of the 
IRA’s enactment in 1934. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009). The Oklahoma 
Indian Welfare Act extended the “rights [and] privileges secured to an organized Indian tribe 
under the [IRA]” to tribes within Oklahoma. Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 § 3, 25 
U.S.C. § 5203 (2012) (formerly cited as 25 U.S.C. § 503). Accordingly, tribes within the 
state may acquire fee title to land and then have the land converted into trust, making it 
Indian country. 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (“[T]he term “Indian country”, as used in this chapter, 
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-
of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the 
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through 
the same.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995) 
(concerning motor fuels tax and income tax); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991) (concerning cigarette taxes).  
 13. See Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 31 F.3d 964, 966 
(10th Cir. 1994) (concerning low-point beer tax), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub 
nom. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, vacated in part sub nom. 
Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995); see 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss3/4
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The current alcohol regulatory structure in Indian country warrants 
review and revision. By allowing both states and tribes to regulate alcohol 
in Indian country, § 1161 clashes with current federal Indian policy. In 
direct contrast to the congressional policy of tribal self-governance, tribes 
located within Oklahoma are effectively forced by Congress to comply with 
the policy decisions of a competing sovereign—the State of Oklahoma. 
Congress should remove this barrier and expressly recognize that tribes 
may exclusively regulate alcohol in Indian country by virtue of their 
inherent sovereignty. Tribes also have a role to play here and should take 
affirmative steps to establish the regulatory and remedial procedures 
necessary to fully regulate alcohol within Indian country.  
While courts have interpreted § 1161, the full scope of the statute 
remains ambiguous. Two specific applications (or attempted applications) 
of § 1161 demonstrate the external friction caused by this ambiguity: (1) 
state taxation of non-Indians in Indian country has led to state-tribal conflict 
and (2) attempts to impose civil tort liability (dram-shop liability)14 on 
tribal alcohol transactions has caused disputes between tribes and non-
Indian tort claimants. 
The answer to easing this friction centers on tribal sovereignty. 
Sovereignty necessitates that a government possess the ability to choose its 
own policies. But § 1161 stifles tribal sovereignty as tribes remain bound 
by state law. To be clear, the argument here is not simply that tribes should 
be able to enact more lenient alcohol laws than the state. As sovereigns, 
however, tribes are best situated to devise their own alcohol policies, 
whatever form they may take. To allow sovereign flexibility, § 1161 should 
be amended to reflect inherent tribal sovereignty. Then the surviving issue 
of non-Indian alcohol transactions in Indian country may be solved through 
cooperative agreements between tribes and the state.  
  
                                                                                                                 
also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Gaming Compact Dispute, Sales Tax and Liquor Disputes 
Between the Citizen Potawatomi Nation and the State of Oklahoma, TURTLE TALK (Oct. 29, 
2014), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/gaming-compact-dispute-sales-tax-and-
liquor-disputes-between-the-citizen-potawatomi-nation-and-the-state-of-oklahoma  (providing 
administrative case materials for In re Revocations of Licenses/Permits of Citizen Potawatomi 
Nation, No. JM-14-005-K (Okla. Tax Comm’n 2014)).  
 14. Dram-shop liability is the “[c]ivil liability of a commercial seller of alcoholic 
beverages for personal injury caused by an intoxicated customer.” Dram-Shop Liability, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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I. History of Alcohol Regulation in Indian Country 
Solving the current problem of § 1161 requires at least a general 
understanding of the complex history of alcohol regulation in Indian 
country. Even modernly, the prevalent stereotype of the “drunken Indian” 
persists.15 For example, in a 2016 New York Times interview concerning 
the Washington NFL mascot controversy, Houston Texans owner Robert 
McNair stated that growing up in western North Carolina, everyone 
respected the Cherokee Indians,16 although “[t]hey might not have 
respected the way they held their whiskey.”17 Worse still, the stereotype 
exists within our criminal justice system: in a case involving an Indian 
charged with forcible assault, the jury foreman purportedly “told the other 
jurors that he used to live on or near an Indian Reservation, that ‘[w]hen 
Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk,’ and that when they get drunk, they 
get violent.”18 This stereotype is neither remote nor new: even Benjamin 
Franklin once mused that “if it be the Design of Providence to extirpate 
these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth . . . it 
seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means.”19 
The “drunken Indian” stereotype stands as enduring evidence of how 
other sovereigns have used alcohol regulation in Indian country as a means 
to self-serving ends. From early contact between Europeans and Native 
peoples, alcohol and its regulation served as a means of usurping tribal land 
and sovereignty.20 In 1911, prohibitionist and Chief Special Officer of the 
                                                                                                                 
 15. For an in-depth discussion of the “drunken Indian” stereotype as manifested through 
policy and legislation, see generally Robert J. Miller & Maril Hazlett, The “Drunken 
Indian”: Myth Distilled into Reality Through Federal Indian Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 223 (1996). 
 16. The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, a federally recognized tribe, is 
headquartered at the Qualla Boundary, within the western portion of North Carolina. 
Interestingly, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians has extensively regulated alcohol within 
its Indian country. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians—Cherokee Code Chapter 18B, 
Regulation of Alcoholic Beverages, 77 Fed. Reg. 5265, 5267 (Feb. 2, 2012). 
 17. Mark Leibovich, Undefeated, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 7, 2016, at MM38, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/magazine/roger-goodells-unstoppable-football-machine.html. 
 18. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration in 
original). 
 19. PETER C. MANCALL, DEADLY MEDICINE: INDIANS AND ALCOHOL IN EARLY 
AMERICA 93 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 199 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1964)). 
 20. See Mimi Ajzenstadt & Brian E. Burtch, Medicalization and Regulation of Alcohol 
and Alcoholism: The Professions and Disciplinary Measures, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCH. 127, 
140 (1990). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss3/4
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Indian Service, William E. Johnson, stated that all Indian wars had been 
either directly or indirectly caused by alcohol.21 As an early example of 
European influence, Hudson Bay Company traders used alcohol to establish 
contacts with Indians and encouraged them to drink so that the traders could 
take advantage of them (and thus boost profits).22 In response to these types 
of actions, Congress enacted the first legislation specifically defining the 
contours of Indian affairs: the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.23 This act 
(also referred to as the Nonintercourse Act) introduced federal regulation of 
trade with Indians, prohibited the purchase of Indian lands except by 
governmental agents, and created punishments for non-Indians who 
committed crimes in Indian country.24  
While the original Trade and Intercourse Act was initially written to last 
for three years, Congress reenacted the statute every three years and 
ultimately passed a permanent Trade and Intercourse Act in 1802.25 The 
1802 Act carried forward the previous policies, and for the first time 
authorized the President “to prevent or restrain the vending or distributing 
of spirituous liquors among all or any of the said Indian tribes.”26 This 
statutory addition “responded to longstanding complaints against the use of 
alcohol as a means of defrauding Indian people and a catalyst to violent 
conflicts between whites and Indians.”27 Partly because of its ambiguous 
definition of Indian country, the federal government loosely enforced the 
1802 Act.28 In fact, tribes did more during this time to regulate alcohol in 
their territories than the federal government.29 For example, Tecumseh, 
prominent leader of the Shawnee, delivered lectures that “ruined the 
business of the whiskey peddler throughout the entire central west for a 
period of years,” and, “for a long time, intoxication became practically 
                                                                                                                 
 21. WILLIAM E. JOHNSON, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC 160 
(1911). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 1.03[2], at 35. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, §  21, 2 Stat. 139, 146. 
 27. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 1.03[2], at 38 (citing FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, 
THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 98-99 
(Univ. Neb. Press 1984)). 
 28. Following the enactment of the Act of 1802, “regulations were made by the War 
Department to prevent the traffic. This, however, was in the days when the rum ration was 
rampant in the army, and the carrying out of a temperance measure was not very thoroughly 
done.” JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 197. 
 29. Id. at 180-87. 
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unknown among the western tribes.”30 Further, many Indian temperance 
organizations arose during this period, and several tribes took the 
punishment of Indians who consumed alcohol into their own hands.31 
The Act of 1834, passed during Andrew Jackson’s presidency, sought to 
more strictly regulate the alcohol trade in Indian country. Adding to the 
language of the 1802 Act, the 1834 Act constituted the first outright 
prohibition of alcohol in Indian country. This Act prohibited the 
introduction or attempted introduction of alcohol into Indian country, 
prohibited distilleries in Indian country, and established specific 
punishments for violations.32 On the same day the Act of 1834 was passed, 
Congress placed all of Indian affairs under the jurisdiction of the War 
Department.33 The Act of 1834 included an exemption for all liquor traffic 
that the War Department deemed necessary.34 But because the War 
Department’s military forts and Indian agents served as the primary contact 
between reservation Indians and non-Indians, this exemption led to the non-
enforcement of the prohibition.35 Refusing to rely solely on federal 
regulation, several tribes passed their own legislation prohibiting the 
introduction of alcohol into their lands.36 
To strengthen the Act of 1834, Congress again amended its Indian 
alcohol policy in 186237 and 1864.38 These measures prohibited any person 
(including an Indian) from selling or providing liquor to Indians, regardless 
of whether or not the transaction occurred in Indian country.39 In 1865, 
however, the Supreme Court distinguished the federal government’s power 
to prohibit alcohol for Indians who were government wards and the police 
power of states to regulate Indians who no longer had tribal ties.40 The 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 183. 
 31. Id. at 183-87. 
 32. Act of June 30, 1834 (Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834), ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, as 
amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 66, 9 Stat. 203; Act of July 29, 1848, ch. 118, § 3, 9 
Stat. 252, 264; Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, §§ 3-6, 10 Stat. 269, 270; Act of Feb. 13, 1862, 
ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338; Act of Mar. 15, 1864, ch. 33, 13 Stat. 29 (carried forward in REV. STAT. 
tit. 28, ch. 4, §§ 2139-2141 (2d ed. 1878)). 
 33. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 735. 
 34. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, § 10. 
 35. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 196-97. 
 36. Id. at 188-92 (summarizing the tribal governments passing prohibition legislation). 
 37. Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338. 
 38. Act of Mar. 15, 1864, ch. 33, 13 Stat. 29 (carried forward in REV. STAT. tit. 28, ch. 
4, § 2140 (2d. ed. 1878)) (recodified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1994)). 
 39. Act of Feb. 13 1862, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338; JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 198-99. 
 40. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 416 (1865). 
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jurisdictional confusion stemming from this distinction again led to loose 
enforcement of the prohibition.41  
During the Allotment Era (1871-1928), Congress aimed to “civiliz[e] 
and assimilat[e]” Indians.42 To further this policy, Congress passed 
legislation allowing for the allotment of tribal lands, attempting to push 
Indians toward a more agricultural lifestyle while (conveniently) creating 
surplus lands which could then be opened to white settlers.43 Allotment led 
to the breakup of vast tribal land bases in Indian Territory (modern-day 
Oklahoma).44 In 1895, Congress passed a special act to specifically prohibit 
alcohol in Indian Territory.45  
In 1906, Congress passed the Oklahoma Enabling Act, which allowed 
for the admission of Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory as the State 
of Oklahoma.46 The statute specifically stated, “[N]othing in the 
[Oklahoma] constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of 
person or property pertaining to the Indians . . . or to limit or affect the 
authority of the [federal government] to make any law or regulation 
respecting such Indians.”47 Following allotment and statehood, courts 
determined that lands “held in trust or restricted status for an Indian tribe 
are Indian country, regardless whether those lands constitute a ‘formal’ 
reservation.”48 And in 1911, the Eighth Circuit specifically held that tribal 
lands of the Five Tribes (Chickasaw, Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, and 
Seminole) remained Indian country for purposes of federal liquor laws.49 
In 1919, Congress passed the National Prohibition Act, prohibiting 
alcohol for the entire nation.50 The Twenty-First Amendment repealed 
national prohibition in 1933.51 National prohibition and its subsequent 
repeal, however, did not affect Indian liquor laws.52 Prohibition in Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Miller & Hazlett, supra note 15, at 248. 
 42. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 72. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 191.  
 45. Act of Mar. 1, 1895, ch. 145, § 8, 28 Stat. 693, 697; see also JOHNSON, supra note 
21, at 203. 
 46. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267. 
 47. Id.  
 48. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 4.07[1][b], at 292. 
 49. U.S. Express Co. v. Friedman, 191 F. 673, 679 (8th Cir. 1911). 
 50. Act of Oct. 28, 1919 (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305. 
 51. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 1-21 (1979). 
 52. See Kennedy v. United States, 265 U.S. 344, 346 (1924) (holding that the National 
Prohibition Act did not repeal Indian liquor laws).  
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country remained in place until Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 1161 during 
the Termination Era. 
II. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 Analysis 
Enacted in 1953, 18 U.S.C. § 1161 allows tribes to authorize liquor in 
the areas of Indian country under their jurisdiction. Section 1161—titled 
“Application of Indian liquor laws”—states: 
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of 
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian 
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian 
country provided such act or transaction is in conformity both 
with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs 
and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having 
jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the 
Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register.53 
The five sections listed in § 1161 prohibit liquor in Indian country. Section 
1154 prohibits the distribution of intoxicants in Indian country, stating, 
“Whoever sells, gives away, disposes of, exchanges, or barters any 
[liquor] . . . into the Indian country” shall be fined and imprisoned (or both) 
for up to one year for the first offense, and fined and imprisoned (or both) 
for up to five years for subsequent offenses.54 Section 1156 prohibits the 
possession of intoxicants and allows the same penalties listed in § 1154.55 
Section 3113 authorizes “any superintendent of Indian affairs, or 
commanding officer of a military post, or special agent of the Office of 
Indian Affairs” having probable cause to conduct searches of persons 
suspected of violating § 1154 or § 1156.56 Section 3488 states that 
possession of intoxicants in Indian country constitutes “prima facie 
evidence of unlawful introduction.”57 Finally, § 3669 allows for the seizure, 
libel, and forfeiture of any conveyance used to introduce intoxicants into 
Indian country.58 
Most importantly here, § 1161 allows tribes to opt out of these 
prohibitions if liquor transactions in Indian country conform to (1) state law 
and (2) a tribal ordinance adopted by the tribe with jurisdiction in that area 
                                                                                                                 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012). 
 54. Id. § 1154. 
 55. Id. § 1156. 
 56. Id. § 3113. 
 57. Id. § 3488. 
 58. Id. § 3669. 
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of Indian country.59 If a tribe chooses not to adopt such an ordinance, liquor 
remains prohibited in that area of Indian country.60  
The Indian Termination policy of the era sheds light on why Congress 
enacted § 1161. The section was enacted under Public Law 277, titled “An 
Act to eliminate certain discriminatory legislation against Indians in the 
United States.”61 The original bill applied only to Arizona, but the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs made the measure generally 
applicable.62 Senate Report 722 states, “[I]f this bill is enacted, a State or 
local municipality or Indian tribes, if they desire, by the enactment of 
proper legislation or ordinance, to restrict the sales of intoxicants to Indians, 
they may do so.”63 Further, the Senate Report included the input of Indians 
as a reason for the statute: “The Indians for many years have complained 
that the liquor laws are most discriminatory in nature. The Indians feel that, 
irrespective of the merits or demerits of prohibition, it is unfair to legislate 
specifically against them in this matter.”64 
While its stated intent was to erase federal prejudice against Indians or 
tribes in the context of alcohol, § 1161 created a different prejudice by 
effectively precluding tribes from formulating their own substantive liquor 
laws. And this aligned with the termination efforts of the day as Congress 
aimed 
as rapidly as possible to make the Indians . . . subject to the same 
laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as 
are applicable to other citizens . . . to end their status as 
wards . . . and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives 
pertaining to American citizens.65 
As part of its attempt to erase federal exceptions for Indians, Congress 
enacted § 1161 to move away from extensive federal regulation of alcohol 
in Indian country. Reading beyond the references to “prejudice” in the 
legislative history, Congress more likely acted to further its termination 
goal of eradicating tribal and Indian statuses altogether. Senate Report 722 
supports this view: “[The] committee is of the belief that all legislation 
discriminating against our Indian citizens should be abolished. Termination 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. § 1161.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Pub. L. No. 277, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 660 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012)). 
 62. S. REP. NO. 83-722 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2399, 2400. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). 
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of the subjection of Indians to Federal laws applicable only to Indians 
certainly appears to be desirable.”66  
III. Supreme Court Review and Interpretation of Section 1161 
The Supreme Court first reviewed § 1161 in United States v. Mazurie.67 
Mazurie involved non-Indian bar owners convicted of introducing alcohol 
into Indian country for failure to obtain a tribal liquor license.68 The bar 
owners had attempted to obtain a tribal liquor license, but their application 
was denied after tribal citizens protested.69 Despite the license denial, the 
bar owners continued to sell liquor, which led to federal criminal 
prosecution and seizure of the alcoholic beverages.70 Mazurie turned on the 
tribe’s ability to regulate liquor on non-Indian fee land within the 
reservation.71 That analysis proves unhelpful in Oklahoma, where no formal 
reservations remain and the majority of Indian country is “trust land,” as 
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).72 But the Court’s reasoning on the tribal 
ability to enact and enforce liquor laws proves very instructive. The Court 
determined that Congress could delegate to tribes the power to regulate 
liquor within their territories.73 Because Congress properly delegated this 
power, the Court did not address whether tribes possess independent and 
inherent power to regulate liquor.74 Further, the Court rejected the 
argument that the tribe could not exercise regulatory jurisdiction over the 
bar owners because they were non-Indians.75 Citing its opinion in Williams 
v. Lee,76 the Court reiterated that tribes have authority over their land 
subject only to congressional defeasance.77 
Mazurie validated tribal authority to regulate under § 1161. The Court 
similarly validated a state’s authority to regulate liquor in Indian country 
under § 1161 in Rice v. Rehner.78 In Rice, a federally licensed Indian trader 
                                                                                                                 
 66. S. REP. NO. 83-722. 
 67. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).  
 68. Id. at 548.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 549.  
 72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 73. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557.  
 74. Id. (“We need not decide whether this independent authority is itself sufficient for 
the tribes to impose Ordinance No. 26.”). 
 75. Id. at 557-58. 
 76. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
 77. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557-58. 
 78. 463 U.S. 713, 734-35 (1983).  
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who owned a store on the Pala Reservation challenged California’s 
regulation requiring that he obtain a state liquor license.79 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that California could not require a license because § 
1161 had a preemptive effect, which conferred the authority to tribes 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.80 Interestingly, a 
legal commentator reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s holding (before Supreme 
Court review) stated, “Although possibly intended as a method of achieving 
the assimilation of Indians into the U.S. mainstream, § 1161 at least 
recognizes the ability of the Indian tribes to govern and control their own 
lives as far as intoxicants are concerned.”81 Further, the article noted that 
“[e]conomic interests seem[ed] to be at the heart of [California’s] claims for 
regulatory jurisdiction, rather than concerns for uniform, statewide 
enforcement.”82  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, noting that tribal 
sovereignty served only as a backdrop to inform preemption analysis. The 
Court suggested that “tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign 
immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians.”83 
Whereas the Mazurie Court cited Williams v. Lee in support of tribal liquor 
regulation, the Rice Court concluded that the Williams presumption of 
sovereignty “would be unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation 
of liquor.”84  
In establishing this exception, the Court cited the long history of federal 
and state regulation of liquor in Indian country.85 Specifically, the Court 
highlighted that Congress required several states—including Oklahoma—to 
prohibit the sale of liquor to Indians as a condition of entry into the United 
States.86 Further, the Court finally addressed the question of inherent tribal 
authority that it avoided in Mazurie, stating, “There can be no doubt that 
Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this 
area.”87 Thus, the Court held that California possessed authority to require 
licensing under § 1161.88 The Court concluded that “Congress did not 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 715-16. 
 80. Id. at 717.  
 81. Thomas E. Lilley, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Indian Country Retail Liquor Sales, 
23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 239, 245 (1983). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Rice, 463 U.S. at 722. 
 84. Id. at 723. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 724. 
 88. Id. at 735. 
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intend to make tribal members ‘super citizens’ who could trade in a 
traditionally regulated substance free from all but self-imposed 
regulations.”89 
The Supreme Court has not directly reviewed § 1161 since Rice, and the 
last time the Court even mentioned the statute was in the 1989 case of 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation.90 The 
Court recently had an opportunity to address the statute, at least 
tangentially, in the 2016 case of Nebraska v. Parker.91 But the Court 
remained silent on § 1161. Parker originated in Omaha Tribal Court, where 
non-Indian business owners sought injunctive and declaratory relief from 
the Omaha Tribal Council members who attempted to enforce the tribal 
liquor license and tax scheme on them.92 Instead of directly challenging the 
tribe’s jurisdiction to regulate alcohol under § 1161, the owners claimed 
that their businesses operated outside of Indian country because Congress 
intended to diminish the reservation boundaries when it passed an 1882 Act 
calling for allotment of the Omaha Reservation.93 In other words, if the 
1882 Act diminished the reservation, then the tribe possesses no regulatory 
jurisdiction over the business owners who own the land in fee. Despite this 
argument, the tribe prevailed in every court: the Omaha Tribal Court, the 
United States Court for the District of Nebraska,94 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,95 and the Supreme Court96 all held that 
the 1882 Act did not diminish the reservation, and so the tribe may enforce 
its alcohol regulations on the business owners.  
Though Parker turned on land distinctions, it sheds light on the tension 
that § 1161 creates between states and tribes. The State of Nebraska 
intervened in Parker at the district court level after the Omaha Tribal 
Council demanded that the Nebraska Tax Commissioner remit the tribal 
share of the fuel tax revenue from retailers located within the reservation 
boundaries.97 The Supreme Court briefs in Parker highlight a pointed 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 734 (citing Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340, 1352 (9th Cir. 1982) (Goodwin, J., 
dissenting), rev'd, 463 U.S. 713 (1983)). 
 90. 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989). 
 91. 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078 (2016). 
 92. Smith v. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815, 817 (D. Neb.), aff’d, 774 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 
2014), aff’d sub nom., Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 844. 
 95. Smith v. Parker, 774 F.3d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom., Nebraska v. 
Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). 
 96. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1072. 
 97. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 831. 
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argument about tribal motivations for regulating liquor. For example, the 
petitioners’ brief (Nebraska, et al.) concluded with the following statement:  
Respondents’ recent effort to assert jurisdiction in the disputed 
area is not a comprehensive plan to administer a broad array of 
government services in and around Pender, but rather simply to 
derive revenue from the sale of alcohol in Pender’s liquor 
retailers and bars. In service of that goal, Respondents ask this 
Court to rewrite history.98  
In other words, according to the State of Nebraska, the tribe’s attempt to 
regulate alcohol amounted to nothing more than a money grab. 
Interestingly, this argument flips the observation made by the article 
discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rice (this time, a state has accused 
a tribe of money-grabbing).99 
The Omaha Tribal Council respondents argued that business owners 
attempted to hide behind a hypothetical jurisdictional confusion that could 
ensue if the reservation remains intact.100 Refuting this argument, the Tribal 
Council members claimed that “[i]n light of [the] well-established doctrinal 
tools to protect the rights of non-Indians, Petitioners’ and amici’s poorly-
defined and inaccurate ‘parade of horribles’ rings hollow.”101 They further 
argued that any jurisdictional problems could be jointly solved: “[S]tate, 
local, tribal, and federal officials can work cooperatively to allocate and, 
where appropriate, share jurisdiction.”102  
The National Congress of American Indians103 (“NCAI”) submitted an 
amicus brief in support of the tribal respondents, stating, “If tribal authority 
to regulate liquor sales in non-Indian communities in Indian country is 
problematic, the solution lies either with Congress or with a proper 
challenge to the scope of § 1161, not with the revision of this Court’s well-
established reservation-boundary jurisprudence.”104 NCAI implied that the 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Brief for Petitioners at 52, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-
1406). 
 99. Lilley, supra note 81, at 245. 
 100. Brief for Omaha Tribal Council Respondents at 21, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 
1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406).  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 59. 
 103. Founded in 1944, the National Congress of American Indians is the oldest and 
largest organization aimed at promoting the interests of tribal governments and communities. 
See NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/ (last visited May 12, 2017).  
 104. Brief for National Congress of American Indians et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 7, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406). 
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scope of § 1161 was the crux of the issue: “The Court’s inability to consider 
the scope of Section 1161 is another reason why the Court might wish to 
consider whether the writ was improvidently granted.”105  
Despite these arguments, the Court limited its unanimous decision to the 
diminishment issue, holding that the 1882 Act did not diminish the Omaha 
reservation.106 Justice Thomas authored the opinion and made no mention 
of § 1161. Although the statute played no role in the outcome of the case, 
the arguments raised by the parties illustrate that the scope of § 1161 
remains in question and that the underlying policy reasoning of the statute 
warrants reevaluation.  
IV. State Taxation of Non-Indian Liquor Transactions in Indian Country 
While § 1161 presents a number of potential problems, two specific 
issues highlight the friction stemming from the statute: taxation and dram-
shop liability. Issues of state taxation of non-Indians engaged in business in 
Indian country extend far beyond the context of alcohol. For example, 
Oklahoma and several tribes within the state have extensively litigated the 
state’s taxation of cigarettes and motor fuels purchased by non-Indians in 
Indian country.107 Unlike those contexts, states have argued in the alcohol 
context that § 1161 provides direct congressional authorization of state-
imposed taxation. Further, Oklahoma’s alcohol regulatory scheme 
aggravates this issue by conditioning the grant and retention of a liquor 
license on the payment of state taxes.108 In an attempt to regulate tribes, 
Oklahoma has threatened to revoke tribes’ liquor licenses and has claimed 
the right to tax alcohol transactions by non-Indians in Indian country.109 
The legal validity of these types of actions taken against tribes often turn 
on murky, case-by-case questions of Federal Indian law. The Supreme 
Court has held that states may tax the activities of non-Indian citizens in 
Indian country subject to a “flexible pre-emption analysis sensitive to the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 7 n.4. 
 106. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1075 (2016). 
 107. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (motor fuels 
tax); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 
U.S. 505 (1991) (cigarette tax). 
 108. See 68 OKLA. STAT. § 212 (2011 & Supp. 2012); 37A OKLA. STAT. § 1-112 
(effective Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?Cite 
ID=479532.  
 109. In re Revocations of Licenses/Permits of Citizen Potawatomi Nation, No. JM-14-
005-K (Okla. Tax Comm’n 2014). 
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particular facts and legislation involved.”110 But the Court has not directly 
addressed whether § 1161 permits states to bypass the standard preemption 
analysis and automatically impose state taxes on non-Indian alcohol 
transactions in Indian country. The judicial trend in the taxation cases does 
not ensure a tribal victory through litigation. Therefore, the best answer—
even beyond the alcohol context—remains to involve tribes in the existing 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax system, which apportions tax collection 
between sovereigns. Alternatively, states and tribes may enter into specific 
cooperative agreements similar to those that have been employed in the 
tobacco context.  
As applied to tribes, Oklahoma’s alcohol scheme presents a specific 
problem because of the state’s ability to revoke licenses upon failure to 
timely remit state sales taxes.111 Title 37, section 528 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes states, “Any [liquor] license issued . . . may be revoked or 
suspended if . . . the licensee has . . . [h]ad any permit or license issued by 
the Oklahoma Tax Commission and required by the Oklahoma Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act, suspended or revoked by the Tax Commission.”112 
The revocability of a license for tax purposes applies to both low-point 
beer113 and alcoholic beverages,114 which is defined as “alcohol, spirits, 
[non low-point] beer, and wine.”115  
While Rice suggests that tribes in Oklahoma must obtain Oklahoma 
liquor licenses in order to comply with state law, the Supreme Court has not 
addressed how taxation might factor into a state liquor regulatory scheme 
when applied to tribes. And lower courts have yet to decide a case 
involving a sales tax imposed via § 1161 strictly analogous to the 
Oklahoma liquor tax scheme. But courts have addressed other states’ 
alcohol schemes imposed under § 1161. In Squaxin Island Tribe v. 
Washington, the Ninth Circuit broadly construed § 1161, holding that 
Washington could tax tribal liquor sales to nontribal members.116 
Washington operated a monopoly liquor system in which the state Liquor 
Control Board purchased liquor from distributors and then retailed it 
through state stores at board-fixed prices.117 Tribes in Washington, 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989). 
 111. 37 OKLA. STAT. § 577(F) (2011).  
 112. Id. § 528(A)(7). 
 113. Id. § 163.16(4). 
 114. Id. § 528(A)(7). 
 115. Id. § 506(3). 
 116. 781 F.2d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 117. Id. at 717. 
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however, purchased liquor from out-of-state distributors and sold it in tribal 
liquor stores with prices including tribal taxes but excluding state taxes and 
surcharges.118 Following Rice, Washington demanded that tribes obtain 
vendor agreements with the state which required prepayment of liquor costs 
and state liquor sales taxes.119 Four tribes then brought suit against the state, 
claiming that Washington lacked authority to tax tribal liquor enterprises.120  
The tribes argued that the state tax on tribal liquor sales aimed purely to 
maximize revenue and thus fell outside of the narrow holding of Rice, 
which applied solely to liquor licensing.121 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
noting that Rice held that tribal sovereignty interests were only implicated 
in sales of liquor to tribal members, and therefore the tribes’ claims “[did] 
not merit serious consideration.”122 Further, the court found that “the 
‘primary purpose of the liquor control system in Washington is control,’ not 
revenue.”123 Under this expansive reading of Rice and § 1161, the Ninth 
Circuit essentially conflated the power to require liquor licensing with the 
power to tax tribal liquor sales in Indian country.  
The tribes in Squaxin additionally argued that the state taxation directly 
burdened124 tribal members and the operation of tribal government and thus 
was impermissible.125 Again, the court flatly rejected this argument, noting 
that the backdrop analysis in Rice identified no tradition of sovereign 
immunity or inherent authority of liquor regulation by Indians.126 Under 
this characterization of Rice, a state could presumably attach any condition 
to liquor licensing. This directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
statements in Rice that liquor licensing is a narrow exception to the general 
rule of tribal sovereignty. Squaxin has received no direct negative treatment 
and remains good law within the Ninth Circuit. 
Note that the liquor control scheme applied in Washington differs 
significantly from the scheme in Oklahoma, which more resembles the 
California free enterprise system reviewed in Rice. In Rice, California 
sought to regulate the state liquor industry through licensing whereas in 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. 
 119. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.150 (amended 1989). 
 120. Squaxin, 781 F.2d at 717-18, 718 n.4.  
 121. Id. at 720.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 
U.S. 463 (1976); see also Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 
685 (1965). 
 125. Squaxin, 781 F.2d at 719. 
 126. Id.  
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Squaxin, Washington sought to completely operate the state liquor industry 
through a monopoly system. Thus, the court in Squaxin may have deferred 
more broadly to Washington because a tribal competitor likely posed a 
significant threat of competition to a heavily state-controlled system.127  
The State of Oklahoma has prevailed in imposing at least one of its 
alcohol taxes in Indian country. In Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Oklahoma Tax Commission, the Tenth Circuit upheld the imposition of an 
Oklahoma tax on 3.2% beer wholesale distributors who sold to tribal retail 
stores.128 In addition to the low-point beer tax, Chickasaw Nation also 
involved challenges to the state motor fuel taxes and state income taxes.129 
The tribe argued that the holding in Rice did not equate the state’s power to 
regulate liquor transactions with the power to tax those transactions.130 The 
Tenth Circuit agreed only to an extent, stating, “We agree that the power to 
regulate does not automatically encompass the power to tax.”131 The Tenth 
Circuit further clarified that taxation could be regulatory so long as it 
played “an integral part of the overall regulatory structure.”132 In 
determining whether the tax played an integral part, the court focused on 
two facts. First, the court found the tax primarily regulatory in nature 
because it was located in title 37 (which regulates intoxicating liquors) of 
the Oklahoma Statutes and thus differed from other taxes (including sales 
taxes) in title 68.133 Second, the court found that the legal incidence of the 
tax fell on the distributors because the tax was imposed on distributors and 
not directly on the tribe.134 Accordingly, the court upheld the tax as an 
integral part of the overall alcohol regulatory scheme.135 The Tenth 
Circuit’s reasoning illustrates the formalistic approach modernly taken in 
                                                                                                                 
 127. This aligns with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the tribal tobacco cases, in which 
the Supreme Court held that tribes were essentially marketing a “tax exemption.” See, e.g., 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 
(1980) (“It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons 
coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes 
have a significant interest.”).  
 128. 31 F.3d 964, 967-68 (10th Cir. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub 
nom. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, vacated in part sub nom. 
Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 129. Id. at 966. 
 130. Id. at 968.  
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Indian taxation cases. But, as a practical matter, whether the legal incidence 
falls on the distributor, the tribe, or the consumer carries little relevance 
because the tax will inevitably raise the overall price and negatively affect 
tribal interests. 
Following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Chickasaw Nation, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, but only on the issues of the motor fuels 
tax and income tax.136 While the tax on low-point beer was not granted 
certiorari, the Supreme Court’s review of the motor fuels tax and income 
tax in Chickasaw Nation illustrates Oklahoma’s persistence on taxing tribal 
businesses and forecasts the actions the state may take if litigation over 
alcohol taxation occurs in the future. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could not apply its 
motor fuels tax to fuel sold by the tribe in Indian country but that the state 
could tax income of all persons residing in the state outside of Indian 
country.137 Oklahoma argued that the Court should weigh the relevant state 
and tribal interests in reviewing the motor fuels tax.138 The Court, however, 
employed a more categorical approach: “‘[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or 
other federal statutes permitting it,’ we have held, a State is without power 
to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.”139 Under this categorical 
approach, the case turned on the legal incidence of the tax: “If the legal 
incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales 
made inside Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear 
congressional authorization.”140  
Unsurprisingly, the motor fuels tax at issue141 failed to specify which 
party the legal incidence rested on.142 In the absence of express language, 
the Court determined the legal incidence fell on tribal retailers because the 
taxing statute required fuel distributors to remit the amount of tax due “on 
behalf of a licensed retailer.”143 Furthermore, the tax did not impose 
liability on a consumer for purchasing or possessing untaxed fuel.144 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 452-53 (1995).  
 137. Id. at 467.  
 138. Id. at 457.  
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Ultimately, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s finding that the legal 
incidence fell on the tribe, thus rendering the tax impermissible.145  
In reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chickasaw Nation, 
Oklahoma restructured the motor fuel tax and recodified it at title 68, 
sections 500.1–531 of the Oklahoma Statutes.146 The Oklahoma legislature 
rewrote the code and expressly placed the legal incidence on consumers: “It 
is the intent of the Legislature that the taxes imposed on motor fuel have 
always been and continue to be declared and conclusively presumed to be a 
direct tax on the ultimate or retail consumer.”147 Further, the legislature 
identified the specific reason for the statutory rewrite: “The purpose of this 
recodification is a result of the interpretation of the motor fuel tax code of 
this state by the federal courts, specifically the decision by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in ‘Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw 
Nation.’”148 
As illustrated in Chickasaw Nation, courts question whether a tax serves 
regulatory or pecuniary purposes in determining its applicability in Indian 
country. The Tenth Circuit deemed the low-point beer tax primarily 
regulatory simply based on its location in title 37 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes.149 Other Oklahoma liquor permits, however, differ from the tax on 
low-point beer upheld in Chickasaw Nation. For example, while the mixed 
beverage tax permit is also located in title 37, the requirement of a sales tax 
permit in that section refers explicitly to title 68 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes.150 This is distinguishable from the tax on low-point beer which 
does not refer to any other section of the state code.151 If a court followed 
the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Chickasaw Nation as to the mixed 
beverage permit, the fact that the condition of a sales tax permit refers back 
to title 68 could indicate a more pecuniary purpose. In any event, under the 
Supreme Court’s formalistic approach, the legal incidence of the tax likely 
controls the outcome. And the Oklahoma Sales Tax expressly states that 
“this Code shall be construed as imposing a tax upon the sale of tangible 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id.  
 146. See Ryals v. Keating, 2000 OK CIV APP 24, 2 P.3d 378 (discussing changes to the 
Motor Fuel Tax Code after Chickasaw Nation).  
 147. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 500.2 (2011)). 
 148. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 149. Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 31 F.3d 964, 968 (10th 
Cir. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
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personal property and services, not otherwise exempted, to the 
consumer.”152 
Litigation is currently underway on this exact issue in the federal court 
system. For example, in the United States District Court for the District of 
South Dakota, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach involves a dispute 
between South Dakota and the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe over the 
applicability of the state’s use tax to non-Indian liquor transactions within 
the tribe’s Indian country.153 The tribe holds three state liquor licenses 
granted pursuant to South Dakota law.154 Similar to the Oklahoma scheme, 
these licenses are conditioned upon the remittance of state taxes.155  
When the tribe sought to renew its licenses in 2009 and 2010, South 
Dakota denied the applications, stating that taxes incurred by non-Indians 
had not been remitted.156 The state based its decision on section 35-2-24 of 
the South Dakota Codified Laws, which states in pertinent part:  
No license granted under this title may be reissued to an Indian 
tribe operating in Indian country controlled by the Indian tribe or 
to an enrolled tribal member operating in Indian country 
controlled by the enrolled tribal member's tribe until the Indian 
tribe or enrolled tribal member remits to the Department of 
Revenue all use tax incurred by nonmembers as a result of the 
operation of the licensed premises, and any other state tax has 
been remitted or is not delinquent.157 
Following an adverse decision in a state administrative proceeding, the tribe 
filed suit in federal court, seeking a preliminary injunction.158 In one of its 
specific claims, the tribe alleges that section 35-2-24 violates 18 U.S.C. § 
1161.159 The State then moved for a judgment on the pleadings under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).160 
The court denied the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
thus the case remains at the district court level.161 The ultimate resolution of 
this case should garner the attention of tribes within Oklahoma, given the 
                                                                                                                 
 152. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1351 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 153. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, 155 F. Supp. 3d 972, 977 (D.S.D. 2015).  
 154. Id. 
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 157. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-2-24 (2011). 
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similarities in the two states’ alcohol regulatory schemes. In the interim, 
District Judge Lawrence Piersol’s opinion denying the motion for judgment 
on the pleadings proves instructive. The arguments articulated in Flandreau 
resemble those at the heart of this article and likely to appear if litigation 
occurs between tribes and Oklahoma on this issue. South Dakota argues 
that the tribe consented to the state’s licensing scheme, and thus state 
taxation, when it applied for a state liquor license.162 The tribe counters 
with two arguments. First, the state cannot “convert invalid on-reservation 
taxes into valid taxes by merely conditioning alcohol licensure on paying 
the taxes.”163 Second, the state’s power to regulate under § 1161 “does not 
empower the state to attach tax conditions to licensures that have no nexus 
to alcohol regulation.”164 Ultimately, this case turns on the scope of § 1161. 
In considering the State’s motion, the court began by reciting the plain 
language of § 1161 and then summarized the Rice decision.165 On the 
specific issue of whether a state may condition liquor licenses upon the 
remittance of taxes, the court stated that the Rice decision “departs from 
relevance” because of its silence on “the more discrete issue of what 
conditions may be attached to licensure.”166 Further, the court characterized 
South Dakota’s argument to mean “that the state laws the tribes must 
comply with may be of indeterminate scope and contemplate a vast array of 
subject matter unrelated to alcohol regulation.”167 The court also dismissed 
the State’s reliance on Squaxin, stating that the “state tax [in Squaxin] was 
valid as it was confined strictly to alcohol sales marketed toward non-
members who were being empowered to avoid state tax impositions.”168 
Unlike Squaxin, the South Dakota scheme shares no apparent nexus with 
alcohol.169  
Ultimately, the court deemed the tribe’s pleadings adequate and denied 
the State’s motion.170 Further, the court identified that the core issue of the 
case turns on the reconciliation of a state’s regulatory authority under § 
1161 with the fact that a “state's authority to tax in Indian country is 
operationally curtailed by a tribe's sovereign immunity.”171 Though the case 
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remains at an early stage, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe won a battle by 
surviving South Dakota’s motion. The district court could have easily 
shoehorned this case under a broad reading of Rice or attempted to resolve 
the case on other grounds. But, for the time being, it seems a federal district 
court stands poised to address the effect of § 1161 on state taxation in 
Indian country.  
This issue could also lead to litigation in Oklahoma. For example, the 
Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Nation”) recently prevailed in arbitration over 
the State of Oklahoma on the issue of the state’s ability to impose taxes on 
non-Indian liquor sales in Indian country.172 The dispute began in 2014 
when the Oklahoma Tax Commission (“OTC”) filed an administrative 
complaint against the Nation and sought to revoke the Nation’s state liquor 
licenses for failure to remit state taxes.173 In this initial complaint, the OTC 
claimed that Oklahoma sales taxes apply to all sales by the Nation to 
nontribal members.174 The Nation argued that its gaming compact with 
Oklahoma required OTC to pursue its claim through arbitration.175 After 
arbitration began, the OTC threatened to close all of the Nation’s businesses 
for failure to comply with Oklahoma tax laws.176 
The arbitrator (former Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Daniel J. 
Boudreau)177 “characterized the underlying dispute in [the] proceeding as 
centering primarily on the Nation’s contention that they have no obligation 
to accede to the State’s demand for all of the Nation’s businesses to collect, 
report and remit sales taxes on sales of goods and services to nontribal 
members.”178 Much of the arbitration award focuses on the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act and the gaming compact between the Nation and the state. 
But ultimately, the Nation won on the argument that even if Oklahoma’s 
Tax Code applies to the Nation’s sales to non-Indians, it would be 
preempted by the federal balancing test established by the Supreme Court 
in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker.179 The arbitrator agreed, and 
he did so based on four findings. First, the Nation identified “significant 
federal and tribal interests in the Nation’s self-governance, economic self-
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 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Daniel J. Bordreau, DISP. RESOL. CONSULTANTS, http://www.drc-ok.com/ 
boudreau-cv/ (last visited May 12, 2017).  
 178. Arbitration Award, supra note 172, at 3.  
 179. Id. at 4-5; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).  
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sufficiency, and self-determination.”180 Second, “the Nation alone invests 
value in the goods and services that it sells, does not derive such value 
through an exemption from State sales taxes, and imposes its own 
equivalent tribal sales tax on the sales.”181 Third, “the State possesses no 
economic interest beyond a general quest for additional revenue in 
imposing [its] sales tax.”182 And fourth, “the federal and tribal interests at 
stake predominate significantly over any possible State interest in the 
transactions.”183 
Interestingly, the arbitrator applied the Bracker balancing analysis,184 
which was developed in 1980 and significantly predates the more 
categorical and formal approach taken by the Supreme Court in Chickasaw 
Nation. 
While this arbitration award bodes well for tribes in Oklahoma, the State 
of Oklahoma has shown a willingness to amend its statutes to 
circumnavigate adverse decisions, as illustrated by the legislative actions 
taken following Chickasaw Nation. While amending § 1161 could erase the 
question of the statute’s current scope, taxation questions may persist. On a 
practical level, better avenues than litigation exist, including seeking 
inclusion in Oklahoma’s existing Streamlined Sales and Use Tax statute or 
through direct cooperative agreements with the state.  
V. The Taxation Solution: Inclusion in the Sales and Use Tax Scheme 
and Cooperative Agreements  
As discussed above, the issue of taxation causes friction between the 
state and tribes as each sovereign attempts to maximize its tax base. The 
Supreme Court has held that a tribe’s authority to tax is an inherent 
government function.185 But for products without “reservation generated 
value,” the state may tax non-Indian purchases of that product in Indian 
country.186 For example, courts likely will not find reservation-generated 
value in tribal cigarette sales when the cigarettes are imported from outside 
of Indian country.187 This creates a potential double taxation problem where 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Arbitration Award, supra note 172, at 5. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45.  
 185. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-40 (1982). 
 186. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 155 (1980) (no preemption for tribes that were merely “market[ing] a [tax] exemption).  
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both the tribe and the state may tax a non-Indian purchase. And the extra 
tax necessarily raises the overall price, which negatively affects a tribe’s 
ability to compete. 
The State of Oklahoma and tribes have addressed tax issues in compacts 
concerning certain industries, including gaming,188 tobacco,189 and 
hunting,190 among others. In the tobacco context, compacts focus directly 
on taxation. For example, the compact between Oklahoma and the Absentee 
Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma states that “the Tribe acknowledges 
that the State tobacco tax does apply to sales to non-members of the Tribe, 
even if they occur on tribal lands.”191 The compact then outlines a detailed 
description of how tobacco taxes are to be imposed and apportioned 
between the tribe and state.192  
The Model Tribal Gaming Compact, however, does not address taxes 
with the same specificity as the tobacco compact. The compact does 
contemplate the sale of alcohol in gaming facilities: “The sale and service 
of alcoholic beverages in a facility shall be in compliance with state, federal 
and tribal law in regard to the licensing and sale of such beverages.”193 But 
on the issue of taxation, the compact only states, “Nothing in this Compact 
shall be deemed to authorize the state to impose any tax, fee, charge or 
assessment upon the tribe or enterprise except as expressly authorized 
pursuant to this Compact.”194 From a facial reading, these two statements 
remain ambiguous as to whether the state may tax non-Indian liquor 
transactions in tribal gaming facilities. Of course, the Citizen Potawatomi 
Nation recently won an arbitration award on this issue. But instead of 
litigating or arbitrating195 the issue, the state and tribes could negotiate 
which state taxes, if any, apply in this context through either cooperative 
                                                                                                                 
 188. See Model Tribal Gaming Compact, 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 (2011). 
 189. See, e.g., Tobacco Tax Compact Between the State of Oklahoma and the Absentee 
Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma (Okla. Sec’y of State No. 47739, Sept. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/90775.pdf [hereinafter Absentee Shawnee 
Tobacco Compact]. 
 190. See Hunting and Fishing Compact Between the State of Oklahoma and the 
Cherokee Nation (Okla. Sec’y of State No. 47580, June 1, 2015), https://www.sos.ok.gov/ 
documents/filelog/90614.pdf. 
 191. Absentee Shawnee Tobacco Compact, supra note 189, at art. 2, § 6. 
 192. Id. 
 193. 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 pt. 5(I) (2011). 
 194. Id. § 281 pt. 11(D). 
 195. The Model Tribal Gaming Compact requires arbitration before a suit can be filed in 
federal court. Id. § 281 pt. 12(2). 
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agreements, the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, or a 
combination of both.  
Oklahoma has a statutory scheme in place that may solve the issue of 
state taxation of non-Indian liquor transactions in Indian country. To more 
efficiently levy its taxes, Oklahoma adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Administration Act.196 This statute aims to alleviate the burdens of tax 
compliance between states by using a central simplified system to apportion 
state sales and use taxes.197 The statute serves as a template agreement for 
states—as separate sovereigns—to cooperate in the administration and 
collection of their respective taxes. The statute, however, makes no 
reference to tribes—the only sovereigns contemplated are other states and 
the District of Columbia.198 Courts have yet to consider tribal inclusion in 
the scheme and few Oklahoma cases address the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Administration Act.199 NCAI advocates for the inclusion of tribes in 
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, yet efforts to include tribes 
in the scheme have yet to gain widespread acceptance.200 Tribal inclusion 
could prove enormously beneficial in Oklahoma, where thirty-eight 
sovereign tribal governments exist. 
North Dakota has entered into sales and use tax agreements with tribes 
located within its borders.201 Chapter 57-39.8, titled “State-Tribal Sales, 
Use, and Gross Receipts Tax Agreements,” grants the governor the 
authority to enter agreements “relating to administration and allocation of 
state and tribal sales, use, and gross receipts taxes.”202 These agreements 
allow tribes and the state to work out tax allocation on their own terms, 
instead of having their rights determined through litigation. Further, tribes 
and the state may enter into general tax agreements, such as the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement, and then specifically compact for certain 
                                                                                                                 
 196. 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1354.14-1377 (2011). 
 197. Id. § 1354.18.  
 198. Id. § 1354.15(12).  
 199. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2014 OK 95, 341 P.3d 56 (holding 
that the Streamlined Act contained an exception for purchases of electricity and natural gas 
utility services); see also City of Tulsa v. State, 2012 OK 47, 278 P.3d 602 (mentioning the 
Streamlined Act in a footnote). 
 200. See Nat'l Cong. Of Am. Indians [NCAI], Relationship Between Tribal Governments 
and the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, Res. GBW-05-028 (June 12-15, 2005), 
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_lPFkSFtsxQhOxSVbIExyTLYzvpRTaNthUN
URQEYNrTuVPkWvjYK_GBW-05-028_SSTP_Resolution.pdf. 
 201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.8-01 (Supp. 2015). 
 202. Id. 
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taxes (tobacco, alcohol, etc.) in which the state may possess an increased 
regulatory interest separate from purely raising revenue.  
VI. Tribes Should Accept Dram-Shop Liability for Liquor Sales 
in Indian Country as an Exertion of Sovereignty  
As discussed above, courts have interpreted § 1161 to mean that states 
may, at the very least, require tribes or individuals selling liquor in Indian 
country to obtain state liquor licenses. Tribes, however, remain generally 
shielded from tort liability arising out of liquor transactions in Indian 
country by virtue of sovereign immunity. This presents a problem for 
consumers in Indian country and for those living near Indian country, which 
constitutes a significant population given the patchwork of Indian country 
in Oklahoma. Tribes can address this issue by enacting tribal tort claim acts 
or through other remedial measures. 
Dram-shop liability is defined as “[c]ivil liability of a commercial seller 
of alcoholic beverages for personal injury caused by an intoxicated 
customer.”203 Tort claimants alleging injuries arising out of liquor 
transactions in Indian country have argued that § 1161 grants courts 
jurisdiction over tribes in this context. Courts, however, have generally 
construed § 1161 narrowly in these cases, finding that the statute does not 
waive tribal sovereign immunity.204 Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe Indians of 
Florida205 illustrates a narrow construction of § 1161 and Rice in the 
context of a tribe’s dram-shop liability. In Furry, a father brought a 
wrongful death suit against the tribe, claiming that his daughter died from 
being over-served by a tribal entity.206 The father argued that the tribe’s 
application for a state liquor license “amounted to a broad agreement to be 
bound by Florida law in all respects.”207 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, 
clarifying that the narrow Rice holding only addressed California’s ability 
to require liquor licensing.208 Thus, the court held that the tribe had not 
expressly waived its sovereign immunity and could not be sued for dram-
shop liability as a result of possessing a liquor license.209  
Oklahoma recently addressed the issue of tribal dram-shop liability in 
Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc. and held that (1) the tribe was 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Dram-Shop Liability, supra note 14. 
 204. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 7.05[1][b], at 639-40. 
 205. 685 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 206. Id. at 1226. 
 207. Id. at 1228. 
 208. Id. at 1230. 
 209. Id. at 1236-37. 
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immune from suit in state court for compact-based torts claims and (2) the 
tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity by obtaining a liquor license.210 
The court noted that the Rice holding was “very narrow” and “limited to a 
regulatory jurisdictional analysis.”211 Consequently, the court held that 
Oklahoma’s regulatory power under § 1161 did not extend to a private 
party’s tort claim against a tribe.212 Furthermore, the court explained, 
“applying for and accepting a state liquor license ‘is nothing more than a 
promise to comply with state liquor laws.’”213 Other state courts have 
similarly held that obtaining a liquor license does not abrogate tribal 
sovereign immunity,214 although at least one state supreme court has 
determined that a state can require that tribes obtain dram-shop insurance 
before a liquor license may be granted and that procuring insurance 
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity.215 
While at first blush these cases seem to be explicit tribal victories, they 
highlight a central problem: a class of tort victims may have no remedy (or, 
perhaps more accurately, may not have the best remedy). The cases 
upholding sovereign immunity were correctly decided and tribes have no 
existing legal duty to adopt tort claim statutes or provide a remedy in these 
situations. But, in terms of asserting sovereignty, such a move may prove 
beneficial.  
Similar to the taxation context, some compacts explicitly address tort 
liability. For example, Part 6 of Oklahoma’s Model Tribal Gaming 
Compact addresses tort claims and limited consent to suit.216 The compact 
requires that tribal enterprises maintain tort liability insurance of not less 
than $250,000 for any one person, $2,000,000 “for any one occurrence for 
                                                                                                                 
 210. 2013 OK 77, ¶ 50, 315 P.3d 359, 373. 
 211. Id. ¶¶ 37, 40, 315 P.3d at 369-70 (emphasis omitted). 
 212. Id. ¶ 43, 315 P.3d at 371. 
 213. Id. ¶ 45, 315 P.3d at 371 (quoting Bittle v. Bahe, 2008 OK 10, ¶ 36, 192 P.3d 810, 
836 (Kauger, J., dissenting)).  
 214. See, e.g., Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians Ass’n, 169 P.3d 53, 59 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2007) (“The Puyallup Tribe has not waived its sovereign immunity to private lawsuits 
in state court. Nor has Congress chosen to abrogate tribal immunity in private dram shop 
actions . . . .”); see also Filer v. Tohono O’Odham Nation Gaming Enter., 129 P.3d 78, 84 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (“The Court in Rice certainly did not hold that California, let alone a 
private citizen, could sue the tribe in state court, despite a claim of sovereign immunity, if 
the action had some connection to the state's regulation of alcohol.”); Holguin v. Ysleta Del 
Sur Pueblo, 954 S.W.2d 843, 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (“We cannot conclude, however, that 
tribal sovereign immunity is waived for a private suit brought under the Texas Dram Shop 
Act.”). 
 215. See Ex parte Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 155 So. 3d 224, 230-31 (Ala. 2014). 
 216. 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 pt. 6 (2011). 
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personal injury,” and $1,000,000 “for any one occurrence for property 
damage.”217 Similar to a governmental tort claims act, the compact requires 
tribal enterprises to first review a tort claim and make a determination 
whether to resolve the claim.218 A claimant may only bring suit after the 
tribal enterprise reviews and decides not to resolve the claim.219 And this 
provision only applies to “patrons,” which is defined as “any person who is 
on the premises of a gaming facility, for the purpose of playing covered 
games authorized by this Compact.”220 Thus, in order to file a compact tort 
claim, the claimant must have been at the casino with the purpose of 
gambling. 
Keeping in mind the Model Compact definition of patron, consider this 
hypothetical: a casino patron becomes intoxicated at a tribal casino, then 
drives away and hits a driver on a state highway. If that driver is injured in 
the wreck, damages may only be recovered from the drunken-driver and not 
from the gaming facility, because the injured drivers would not fit within 
the definition of “patron.” And, of course, the result would not be the same 
if the drunken-driver had been over-served at a local bar governed by state 
law. So while gaming compacts may cover some liquor transactions (and 
the possible dram-shop liability) in Indian country, they fall far short of 
comprehensive. Moreover, a tribe may operate restaurants or convenience 
stores not covered by the compact. Tribes can cover these facilities by 
enacting tribal tort claim statutes. Tribal tort claim acts could also extend to 
gaming facilities and provide remedies for non-patrons who may be injured 
by dram-shop torts.  
Adoption of a tort claim act gives tribes both internal and external 
legitimacy. Internally, tribal members who may be victims of torts arising 
out of tribal liquor transactions (or other torts) would benefit from an 
explicit statutory remedy. Externally, such a measure would grant non-
Indians (and non-patrons) specific protections and would encourage the use 
of tribal courts. On a practical level, adopting tort claim acts could deter 
future litigation on the issue. In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 
the Supreme Court hinted that a future case (with the right facts) might 
warrant a reevaluation of sovereign immunity in a way that would affect the 
non-patron issue discussed above.221 There, the Court noted that it has not 
“specifically addressed (nor, so far as we are aware, has Congress) whether 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Id. at pt. 6(A)(1). 
 218. Id. at pt. 6(A)(8). 
 219. Id. at pt. 6(A)(9). 
 220. Id. at pt. 3(20). 
 221. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 n.8 (2014). 
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immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other plaintiff 
who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain 
relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.”222 Further, assuming dram-
shop liability could vitiate Oklahoma’s possible argument that tribes remain 
incapable or unwilling to legitimately regulate liquor within their Indian 
country. This argument has been raised in Parker, with Nebraska claiming 
that the tribe simply sought to gain revenue as opposed to instituting a 
comprehensive regulatory plan.223  
In terms of economic development, outside investors and customers 
would likely be more attracted to conduct business with tribal entities with 
a more solid legal framework in place.224 These concerns have prompted 
some tribes to adopt statutory provisions similar to Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. While tort claim acts present some obvious benefits, one 
legitimate downside is cost. Tribes must be willing to pay for tort liability 
arising out of alcohol transactions. Several tribes have mitigated this 
financial risk by taking out insurance policies on future liability and, in 
certain contexts, tribes may be bound by compacts to require such 
insurance.225 Tribes may also place a statutory cap on damages recoverable 
directly from the tribe in these cases. The Absentee Shawnee Tribe of 
Indians of Oklahoma adopted this approach in its Tort Claim Act, expressly 
prohibiting awards of exemplary or punitive damages.226 Other tribes, 
including the Mississippi Band of Choctaws, have enacted similar statutes 
requiring tort claimants to file a claim notice with the tribe’s attorney 
general within one year of the alleged tortious act.227 The attorney general 
                                                                                                                 
 222. Id.  
 223. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 98, at 52. 
 224. Robert J. Miller, American Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique Challenges, Unlimited 
Potential, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1309 (2008) (“In the modern day, many tribal 
governments and reservations are not considered business friendly locations. This is not 
necessarily because they are anti-business, but because they often have not yet enacted the 
laws and regulatory codes considered crucial for the success of business and for attracting 
new businesses and investments.”). 
 225. See 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 pt. 6(A)(1) (2011) (“During the term of this Compact, 
the enterprise shall maintain public liability insurance for the express purposes of covering 
and satisfying tort claims.”). 
 226. Absentee Shawnee Governmental Tort Claims Act § 7(B) (2010) (“No award for 
damages in an action or any claim against the Tribe shall include punitive or exemplary 
damages.”). 
 227. See MISS. BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS TRIBAL CODE § 25-1-6(3) (2015), http:// 
www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%2025%20-%20Choctaw%20Torts%20 
Claim%20Act.pdf. 
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then has six months to evaluate the claim.228 The statute also grants the 
tribal chief and the secretary/treasurer to settle any tort claim up to a 
specified statutory amount.229 These approaches clearly define the rights of 
customers making alcohol transactions in Indian country and those who 
suffer torts because of those transactions. Further, these acts are exercises 
of sovereignty and manifest tribes’ willingness to regulate alcohol within 
their Indian country.  
VII. Fixing the Section 1161 Problem 
Though the prospect of spurring Congress to action seems daunting, the 
exercise of fixing the statutory language is straightforward. Recall the 
statutory language: 
The provisions of section 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of 
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian 
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian 
country provided such act or transaction is in conformity both 
with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs 
and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having 
jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the 
Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal 
Register.230 
First, the language “both with the laws of the State in which such act or 
transaction occurs and” should be deleted, removing the regulatory 
authority delegated to states.  
Next, Congress should add language recognizing tribal inherent 
authority, as opposed to delegated authority, to regulate liquor within Indian 
country. The Supreme Court case of Duro v. Reina231 and the subsequent 
“Duro fix” illustrate the need for inherent authority language. In Duro, the 
Court held that tribes lack inherent authority to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.232 In response to the Duro decision, 
Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) to reflect “the 
inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise 
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criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”233 This legislative move was coined 
as the “Duro fix.”234 The Supreme Court subsequently validated the Duro 
fix in U.S. v. Lara, admitting that “the Constitution authorizes Congress to 
permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute 
nonmember Indians.”235 
To clarify the Duro fix, consider the following illustration. Tribal 
sovereignty should not be considered as a rock that cannot be restored once 
chipped away. Instead, tribal sovereignty should be considered as an 
inflated balloon: although the balloon may be compressed, the balloon 
expands upon removal of the compression. Congressional solutions such as 
the Duro fix can remove such compression on tribal sovereignty.  
Inherent authority language is necessary in § 1161. Recall the Supreme 
Court’s language in Rice: “There can be no doubt that Congress has 
divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate [alcohol].”236 In 
Mazurie and Rice, the Court looked to congressional delegation or 
divestiture of authority in the alcohol regulation context.237 Using the Duro 
fix to recognize inherent authority in this context ensures that courts 
reviewing an amended § 1161 will not undermine tribal authority on 
congressional delegation or divestiture grounds.  
Other legal commentators have noted the need for congressional 
recognition of tribal inherent sovereignty in this context.238 For example, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Government made federal statutes concerning Indian country (including § 
1161) generally inapplicable to Alaska Natives.239 As a result, as to Alaska 
Natives, it has been argued that § 1161 should be amended to reflect 
inherent tribal sovereignty, which “would ensure that Alaska Native tribes 
have the authority to regulate alcohol transactions and consumption by 
tribal members residing in the village and would remove the risks and 
                                                                                                                 
 233. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215-16 
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Congress’s amendment of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act in response to Duro). 
 234. Lara, 541 U.S. at 216 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
 235. Id. at 210 (majority opinion). 
 236. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983). 
 237. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Rice, 463 U.S. at 734-35.  
 238. See, e.g., Catherine E. Polta, Tribal Jurisdiction over Social and Minor Crimes: The 
Only Feasible Resolution for Institutional Racism in Alaskan Criminal Law Enforcement, 6 
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administrative burden of litigation to explore the scope of inherent tribal 
sovereignty.”240 
In addition to recognizing tribal inherent sovereignty, Congress should 
retain the federal statutory prohibition of alcohol in Indian country (§§ 
1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669). Of course, once a tribe acts on its 
inherent sovereignty and adopts an ordinance, the federal prohibition 
disappears from Indian country under that tribe’s jurisdiction. Keeping the 
federal prohibition ensures a default law applies to alcohol in Indian 
country in the event that a tribe chooses not to act. Additionally, the 
requirement of certification by the Secretary of the Interior and publication 
in the Federal Register should be kept if not only for the purpose of 
notifying government actors—both federal and local—and the public that 
federal prohibition of alcohol in that area of Indian country no longer 
applies. 
Considering all of these issues, the statutory rewrite could be as simple 
as this:  
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of 
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian 
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian 
country provided such act or transaction is in conformity with an 
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe, in exercise of its inherent 
sovereignty to regulate alcohol and having jurisdiction over 
such area of Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the 
Interior, and published in the Federal Register. (emphasis added 
to proposed language). 
Through such a revision, tribes would be able to regulate liquor in their 
jurisdiction without having to genuflect to state law.  
VIII. Conclusion 
The strained relationship between Oklahoma and tribes can be seen by 
looking at the amount of past litigation between the parties (not to mention 
the contentious history more generally). As for alcohol regulation in Indian 
country, many issues remain on the horizon as this article seeks to point 
out. Instead of solely relying on judges to craft piecemeal solutions (or 
perhaps piecemeal confusions) to questions of regulatory authority over 
alcohol, Congress should revisit a main source of these problems: 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 1161. Put simply, § 1161 remains as a relic of the Termination Era and 
conflicts with Congress’s current policy of self-determination.  
Many tribes perform significant governmental functions such as 
environmental regulation and healthcare provision. Moreover, tribes in 
Oklahoma have already exhibited the specific ability and willingness to 
regulate liquor within their own jurisdictions. For example, the Chickasaw 
Nation devotes an entire chapter of its code to alcohol, stating that “it is 
necessary to adopt strict controls over the operation of certain beverage 
sales conducted in Indian Country which is under the jurisdiction of the 
Chickasaw Nation.”241 The regulation of alcohol should no longer 
contradict the general rule that tribes possess the inherent sovereignty to 
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